


























































The	general	public	 in	Northern	 Ireland	has	not	been	well	 served	by	the	Brexit	debate.	
The	UK	debate	has	been	concerned	with	the	implications	of	Brexit	for	the	UK	as	a	whole,	
and	not	on	 specific	 issues	affecting	Northern	 Ireland.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Northern	






on	the	defence	of	 the	UK’s	sovereignty	over	Northern	 Ireland	the	pooling	of	 that	very	






This	 report	 is	 not	 a	 campaigning	 document,	 but	 it	 does	 attempt	 to	 inform	 some	 key	
areas	of	the	Brexit	debate.	It	conveys	our	concerns,	estimations,	and	opinions	as	a	group	
made	 up	 of	 legal	 academics	 researching	 in	 international	 law,	 trade	 law,	 UK	
constitutional	 law,	 human	 rights	 law	 and	 EU	 law	 on	 some	 key	 aspects	 of	 how	 Brexit	















the	 EU	 to	 be	 concerned	with	 regarding	 this	 special	 relationship	 –	 since	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Amsterdam,	a	Protocol	attached	to	the	EU	Treaties	permits	 ‘free	movement’	between	
Ireland	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 to	 continue.	 Both	 states	 remain	 outside	 of	 the	
Schengen	passport-free	travel	zone	and	this	has	meant	that	the	particular	nature	of	the	












to	 enforce	 the	 same	 travel	 arrangements	 as	 the	
UK.	 Neither	 country	 required	 passports	 for	 travel	
between	each	other.	 Following	 the	Second	World	
War,	 the	 UK’s	 Ireland	 Act	 1949	 formalised	 the	
special	relationship	by	declaring	that	Ireland,	while	




don't	 have	 sealing	 of	 the	
border,	so	why	would	Northern	










In	 1952	 a	 Common	 Travel	 Area	 (CTA)	 was	 agreed,	 in	 place	 of	 the	 existing	 informal	
arrangements.	 This	 travel	 area	 covers	 the	 two	 states.	 The	 CTA	 enables	 UK	 and	 Irish	
nationals	to	be	treated	almost	identically	within	both	states.	For	example,	UK	citizens	in	
Ireland	and	Irish	citizens	in	the	UK	have	the	right	to	vote	in	local,	national	and	European	
elections.	Both	 sets	of	 citizens	enjoy	unfettered	access	 to	employment,	 social	welfare	









residency	 within	 the	 CTA.	 While	 all	 EU	 nationals	 living	 within	 the	 CTA	 for	 a	 specific	





the	Schengen	agreement,	which	encompasses	all	 other	EU	members,	 as	well	 as	 some	










Pre-referendum	 negotiations	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 Irish	 Governments	 covered	 the	
possibility	 that	any	potential	post-Brexit	welfare	restrictions	 imposed	upon	EU	citizens	
would	not	apply	to	Irish	nationals.	EU	law,	however,	requires	equal	treatment	between	




does	 not	 mention	 welfare	 arrangements,	 and	 although	 the	 special	 electoral	 law	











Brexit	would	 also	mean	 that	 the	 Ireland-UK	 border	would	 become	 a	 part	 of	 the	 EU’s	
external	 border.	 The	 Vote	 Leave	 campaign	 remains	 committed	 to	 ceasing	 the	 UK’s	
implementation	of	EU	regulations	and	UK	contributions	to	the	EU	budget.	It	is	therefore	
unlikely	 that	 the	UK	would	opt	 to	remain	 in	 the	European	Economic	Area	 (EEA)	 in	 the	
event	of	Brexit,	as	EEA	countries	 like	Norway	–	despite	not	being	EU	member	states	–	
are	 bound	 by	 a	 range	 of	 EU	 rules	 and	make	 high	 per	 capita	 contributions	 to	 the	 EU	
budget.	If	the	UK	did	not	become	an	EEA	state	following	Brexit,	Brussels	would	have	to	








Upon	 Brexit,	 the	 UK-Ireland	 border	 would	
represent	 an	 external	 border	 to	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
whole.		There	are	no	other	‘external’	EU	borders	




The	consequence	of	 this	 refusal	has	been	 for	all	
Nordic	Passport	Union	countries	within	Schengen	
to	 adopt	 stringent	 border	 controls	 vis-à-vis	 the	
Faroe	 Islands:	 individuals	 from	 the	 Faroe	 Islands	






protection	of	 its	external	border	notwithstanding	the	pre-existing	 ‘special	 relationship’	
between	the	Faroe	Islands	and	the	other	Nordic	countries,	and	regardless	of	the	small	
number	 of	 individuals	 involved.	 A	 second	 example	 from	 the	 region	 is	 the	 border	
between	Norway	and	 Sweden,	which	 as	 an	EU	external	 border.	As	part	 of	 the	Nordic	




Maintaining	 the	 CTA	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Brexit	would	 also	 be	 difficult	 to	 square	with	 the	
immigration	arguments	advanced	by	Vote	Leave	in	the	referendum	campaign.	It	would	
enable	EU	nationals	with	a	right	to	reside	in	Ireland	to	become	Irish	citizens	and	thereby	




















Under	 law	 in	 the	UK	 and	 Ireland	 the	 citizens	 of	 both	 countries	 are,	with	 some	minor	
exceptions,	 treated	 identically	 in	 law.	 Passport-free	 travel	 and	 ease	 of	 access	 to	
employment	 has	 been	 the	 norm	 since	 Irish	
independence,	albeit	for	much	of	the	history	of	the	
border	customs	checks	existed.	The	UK	 leaving	 the	
EU	 would	 have	 significant	 consequences	 on	 the	
continuation	 of	 the	 CTA	 arrangements.	 In	 the	
aftermath	of	Brexit,	 Ireland	would	be	 faced	with	 a	












Should	 Ireland	enter	 the	Schengen	area,	 it	would	 find	 itself	 in	an	exact	parallel	 to	 the	
Nordic	 Passport	 Union	 outlined	 above.	 A	 hard	 border	 would	 come	 in	 practice	 into	
existence,	 requiring	 both	 EU	 immigration	 and	 customs	 law	 to	 be	 applied	 at	 the	 Irish	
border.	 Ireland’s	 commitments	 to	 the	 EU,	 which	 have	 been	 adopted	 into	 the	 Irish	
Constitution,	would	take	precedent	 in	domestic	 law	over	any	other	treaty-based	trade	
commitment	with	the	UK.	With	the	protections	that	the	CTA	has	enjoyed	under	Protocol	
20	to	the	EU	treaties	no	 longer	operative	 in	the	event	of	Brexit,	 Ireland	will	 likely	face	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	 relationship	 between	 the	
UK	 and	 Ireland	 when	 it	 comes	
to	 this	 common	 travel	 area	 is	

















capital	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 restrictions	 as	 for	 other	 non-Schengen	 non-EU	
states.	At	 a	minimum,	a	 customs	 check	would	be	 required	at	 the	border.	However,	 if	









area	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 EU.	 If	 the	 UK	 is	 outside	 Schengen	 any	 negotiation	
regarding	the	UK’s	relationship	with	the	EU,	for	example	regarding	the	creation	of	a	free	
trade	 area,	 would	 necessarily	 include	 consideration	 of	 the	 land	 border	 with	 the	 Irish	
Republic.	However,	 leaving	aside	the	“mega-regional”	trade	agreements	that	the	EU	is	
currently	working	 on	 concluding	with	 Canada	 and	US,	 amongst	 other	 states,	 the	 only	
“free	 trade”	 arrangements	 that	 have	 existed	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 non-EU	 Member	
States	 to	date	have	necessitated	acceptance	of	 free	movement	 rules.	The	 ‘Leave’	and	
‘Remain’	 campaigns	have	both	made	clear	at	 this	 stage	 that	 the	 so-called	Switzerland	
option	does	not	appeal	to	them	–	at	which	point,	 there	again	 is	no	existing	precedent	












It	 would	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 UK	 to	 join	 the	 Schengen	 area	 even	 if	 it	 left	 the	 EU.	
Liechtenstein,	Iceland,	Norway	and	Switzerland	are	all	non-EU	countries	that	are	part	of	










for	 the	 Irish	 Border	 after	 Brexit	 has	 opened	 up	 the	 field	 to	 a	 range	 of	 seemingly	 far-
fetched	proposals.	The	Northern	Ireland	Affairs	Committee	first	mooted	the	idea	of	the	
Northern	 Ireland-Republic	 of	 Ireland	 border	 remaining	 open,	 but	 checks	 on	 travellers	
from	Northern	 Ireland	 accessing	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 UK.	 This	 singly	 unattractive	 solution,	
which	David	Cameron	mooted	at	 Prime	Ministers’	Questions	 as	 a	 possible	post-Brexit	
scenario,	 would	 leave	 Northern	 Ireland	 no	 longer	 a	 member	 of	 the	 EU	 and	
simultaneously	restrict	access	from	Northern	Ireland	to	the	remainder	of	the	UK.	Such	










In	 light	of	 the	EU	referendum,	genealogy	has	become	much	more	 important	 for	many	
UK	citizens.		Individuals	born	in	Northern	Ireland	to	parents	who	are	Irish	or	UK	citizens	
are	automatically	entitled	to	claim	Irish	citizenship.	Those	born	in	Great	Britain	with	an	






While	 those	 in	 favour	 of	 Brexit	 are	 obviously	 willing	 to	 forego	 the	 benefits	 of	 EU	
citizenship	 in	order	 for	 the	UK	 to	 take	 “control”	over	migration	 to	 the	UK	 there	are	a	
series	of	consequences	for	individuals	travelling	or	
working	 within	 Europe.	 Unless	 or	 until	 a	 visa-
waiver	 scheme	 is	 negotiated	 following	 Brexit,	 UK	
citizens	 will	 have	 to	 adopt	 a	 “pay	 as	 you	 go”	
approach	 to	 traveling	 to	EU	countries,	completing	
the	necessary	entry	 requirements	 to	enable	 them	
to	 travel	 (as	 is	 the	 case	 now	 for	 travel	 to	 many	
non-EU	countries).	Moreover,	senior	figures	within	
the	Vote	Leave	campaign	have	maintained	that	travellers	to	and	from	Europe	will	need	
visas	 to	 enter	 the	 UK	 post-Brexit.	 If	 such	 a	 policy	 were	 pursued,	 the	 EU	 would	 put	
reciprocal	 arrangements	 in	place.	 The	 consequences	 for	 the	 Irish-UK	border	would	be	
similar	to	those	noted	above;	thorough	migration	checks	at	the	border.	
	
Even	 if	 a	 visa-waiver	 scheme	 is	 introduced,	many	of	 the	benefits	 currently	 associated	
with	 EU	 citizenship	will	 likely	 be	 lost	 under	 any	post-Brexit	 arrangements.	UK	 citizens	
will	almost	certainly	no	 longer	be	able	 to	 rely	on	 the	European	Health	 Insurance	Card	
Campaigning	Claim	
“You	 have	 got	 the	 Vienna	
convention,	 which	 guarantees	








scheme	 in	 lieu	of	 travel	 insurance,	because	 the	UK	would	be	highly	unlikely	 to	extend	
reciprocal	protections	to	EU	citizens	in	light	of	Vote	Leave’s	emphasis	upon	the	pressure	
such	 commitments	 place	 upon	 the	 NHS.	 Even	 if	 a	 visa	waiver	 scheme	 is	 adopted	 for	




For	host	 states	 (some,	 such	as	France,	Spain	and	 Ireland	with	 large	populations	of	UK	
citizens)	Brexit	would	need	to	be	followed	by	a	transition	period	in	which	the	status	of	
resident	 UK	 nationals	 is	 changed	 from	 EU	 citizens.	 At	 issue	 in	 the	 Brexit	 debate	 is	
whether	 this	 change	 in	 status	 would	 entail	 a	 diminution	 of	 rights	 for	 UK	 citizens	
currently	 resident	 in	 other	 EU	 countries,	 or	 even	 the	 deportation	 of	 UK	 citizens	 no	















residents.	 If	 they	 are	 not	 to	 fall	 foul	 of	 any	 upheavals	 consequent	 upon	 Brexit,	 the	











EU	 citizenship)	 would	 offer	 an	 obvious	 solution.	 But	 changing	 nationality	 is	 often	 an	
expensive	and	complicated	decision	(to	say	nothing	of	the	emotional	ties	of	identity	that	
nationality	 raises).	 To	 naturalise	 in	 their	 country	 of	 residence,	 they	 would	 have	 to	
navigate	 its	 immigration	 and	 nationality	 systems	 and	 establish	 their	 value	 to	 its	
economy	 before	 they	 would	 be	 accepted	 as	 citizens.	 If	 successful,	 this	 might	 mean	
having	 dual	 nationality	 (for	 example	 being	 a	 French	 and	 UK	 citizen)	 or	 having	 to	





an	 individual	 seeking	 to	 naturalise	 to	 have	 lived	 in	 France	 for	 5	 years	 and	 be	 able	 to	
speak	 French.	 Irish	 citizenship	 (other	 than	 the	 sanguinity	 route)	 requires	 8	 years	 of	





claim	 citizenship	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 become	 too	 popular	 as	 a	 backdoor	 to	 the	 EU,	
Ireland	 might	 have	 to	 reconsider	 these	 arrangements	 under	 pressure	 from	 Brussels.	





















A	 key	 theory	 underpinning	 global	 desires	 for	 trade	 that	 is	 as	 ‘free’	 as	 possible	 is	
eighteenth	 century	 political	 economist	 David	 Ricardo’s	 concept	 of	 comparative	
advantage.	 It	 suggests	 that	 every	 country	 should	 focus	 on	 producing/providing	 what	
they	 are	 best	 at	 producing,	 and	 trade	 that	 product	 or	 service	 for	 other	 products	 or	
services.	 Even	 where	 a	 country	 is	 not	 ‘the	 absolute	 best’	 at	 anything,	 comparative	
advantage	 says	 that	 countries	 should	 specialise	 in	 those	 industries	where	 they	have	a	
clear	chance	at	outperforming	other	countries.	
	
Comparative	 advantage	 is	 not	 an	 unchallenged	
theory,	but	it	is	the	basis	for	all	global	and	regional	
customs	and	 free	 trade	areas.	At	present,	 Ireland	
and	 Northern	 Ireland	 have	 slightly	 differing	
comparative	advantages.	Northern	Ireland,	as	part	
of	 the	 UK,	 is	 within	 a	 very	 large	market	 and	 has	
ease	 of	 access	 to	 the	 City	 of	 London,	 UK	
government	 support,	 and	 direct	 access	 to	 EU	
customers	 and	 suppliers.	 Ireland,	 on	 the	 other	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 will	
take	 us	 years	 to	 negotiate	 a	
new	 trade	deal—it	will	 not,	 for	
the	 simple	 reason	 that,	 if	 firms	








hand,	 currently	 has	 a	 comparatively	 low	 corporate	 tax	 rate,	 a	 concentration	 of	
multinational	pharma-chem	companies	and	technology	firms,	and,	again,	direct	access	





Ireland	 would	 become	 the	 sole	 English-language	 entry	 point	 (besides	 Malta)	 for	
international	firms	seeking	to	do	business	in	the	EU.	This	would	undoubtedly	represent	
an	 advantage	 as	 English	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 main	 business	 languages.	 Second,	 on	








World	Trade	Organisation,	upon	 the	Norwegian	or	 Swiss	model,	 or	 some	 third	option	
(like	 the	 EU-Canada	 trade	 agreement).	 However,	 agreeing	 upon	 such	 a	model	 would	
take	time,	and	the	 interim	uncertainty	will	make	attracting	both	 foreign	and	domestic	
investment	 difficult.	 Ireland	would	 not	 face	 such	 uncertainty,	 amplifying	 the	 different	
positions	it	and	Northern	Ireland	are	in.		
	
Take,	 for	example,	 the	support	 that	 the	agricultural	 industry	now	receives.	Farmers	 in	
Ireland	 would	 continue	 to	 have	 unrestricted	 access	 to	 the	 EU	 market	 as	 well	 as	
continuing	 to	 receive	 substantial	 subsidies.	 While,	 for	 now,	 the	 UK	 Government	 has	
promised	 to	 continue	 agricultural	 support	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Brexit,	






more	 seriously,	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 agricultural	 industry	 would,	 post-Brexit,	 have	 to	
compete	with	the	highly	protected	industry	in	Ireland	and	the	rest	of	Europe.	It	would	




for	 reduction	 in	 agricultural	 support	 within	 Europe	 and	 the	 US,	 but	 with	 very	 little	
success.	Given	that	talks	at	the	WTO	are	at	a	standstill	(in	no	small	part	because	of	a	lack	






















The	 Remain	 and	 Brexit	 campaigns	 do	 not	 agree	 on	much,	 but	 all	 sides	 concede	 that	
withdrawal	 would	 have	 consequences	 on	 how	 goods	 and	 services	move	 between	 EU	







in	 the	 European	 Economic	 Area	 (EEA),	 the	 free	
movement	of	goods	and	services	between	 Ireland	
and	 the	UK	would	 be	maintained,	 though	 the	UK	
could	set	 its	own	border	 tariffs.	But,	as	 is	 likely,	a	
more	 comprehensive	 withdrawal	 or	 a	 Swiss-style	
agreement	 would	 mean	 that	 UK	 goods	 and	
services	 would	 become	 subject	 to	 the	 EU’s	
external	tariffs.	This	option,	often	accompanied	by	
references	 to	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organization	
(WTO),	would	increase	import	and	export	costs	for	a	significant	number	of	products	as	
well	 as	 a	 plethora	 of	 restrictions	 to	 cross-border	movement	 of	 services.	 Any	 of	 these	
options	 would	 also	 mean	 an	 end	 to	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 payments	 to	
farmers	which	would	naturally	have	a	knock-on	effect	on	the	agri-food	sector.	
	
It	 is	 easy	 to	 assume	 that	 such	 changes	 will	 only	 hit	 business	 and	 not	 the	 private	
consumer,	however,	this	is	only	a	partial	view.	For	instance,	just	as	gifts	above	a	certain	
value	 from	 the	US	are	 subject	 to	 customs,	packages	 sent	between	 relatives	 in	 Ireland	
and	Northern	 Ireland	would	also	have	 to	pay.	Personal	 items	are	ordinarily	exempted	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	 uncertainty	 about	 the	
financial	assistance	that	may	be	
on	 offer	 to	 our	 farming	
communities	 …	 exists	 equally	













such	 as	make-up	 and	 personal	 hygiene	 items,	 textiles	 and	 basic	 building	 construction	
items	(such	as	doors	and	windows)	face	import	charges	of	between	4	and	8%.	Clothing	is	
generally	met	with	import	duties	ranging	from	8	to	17%,	and	cars	face	import	duties	of	




The	 impact	 upon	 the	 agri-food	 and	 farming	 sector	 is	 particularly	 revealing.	 Most	
agricultural	products	and	 livestock	are	subject	to	EU	 import	tariffs	of	between	6%	and	
22%.	UK	agri-food	products	would	find	it	difficult	to	compete	with	heavily	subsided	EU	
produce	 on	 the	 global	 market	 without	 reducing	 their	 basic	 costs	 in	 order	 to	 be	
competitively	priced.	Even	within	the	UK,	it	is	likely	that	suppliers	will	use	the	cheapest	
available	option	which,	due	to	CAP	subsidies,	may	very	well	still	be	EU	products,	even	
with	 the	 imposition	 of	 UK	 tariffs	 on	 imports	 from	 the	 EU.	 Statistics	 from	 the	 UK	
Department	 of	 Environment,	 Food	 and	 Rural	 Affairs	 demonstrate	 that	 direct	 EU	
payments	 to	 farmers	 represent	 87%	 of	 annual	 farm	 income	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 The	
Department	 also	 confirmed	 that	 in	 the	 last	 10	 years	 (2005-2014)	 CAP	 Single	 Farm	
Payment	alone	totalled	£2.5	billion	in	Northern	Ireland.	While	the	UK	Government	has	
stated	that	 initially	 it	would	match	CAP	support	 in	event	of	Brexit	 its	previously	stated	
reform	proposals	indicate	that	it	may	be	unlikely	to	match	the	current	levels	of	subsidy	











relatively	 straightforward.	 Post	 Brexit,	 under	 the	WTO,	 these	 will	 be	 covered	 by	 the	
General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Service	 (GATS)	 which	 is	 significantly	 less	 open	 to	
services	movement	than	the	EU	is.	Non-EU	nationals	temporarily	staying	and	working	in	
the	EU,	unless	they	are	in	senior	management,	will	find	far	more	barriers	to	travel.	Post-
Brexit,	 virtually	 all	 UK	 nationals	 would	 need	 to	 satisfy	 national	 immigration	
requirements	 to	 temporarily	 stay	 and	 work	 in	 any	 of	 the	 28	 EU	 Member	 States,	
including	 Ireland.	 For	 instance,	 Ireland	 permits	 access	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 computer-
related	data	entry	work,	but	has	not	opened	up	any	access	for	those	hoping	to	provide	
real	 estate-related	 services.	 	 Such	 rules	 vary	 in	 each	 of	 the	 28	 states.	 Establishing	 a	
commercial	 presence	 in	 an	 EU	Member	 State	 also	 becomes	 complicated	 as	 the	WTO	
does	not	contain	a	single	‘rule’	on	setting	up	a	business.		
	





UK	 could	 take	a	protectionist	 route	and	 increase	 tariffs	 to	protect	 its	 home	produced	










Both	 Ireland	 and	 Northern	 Ireland	 benefit	 from	 several	 funding	 streams	 available	
through	 the	 EU.	 Under	 the	 EU	 Cohesion	 Policy	 (2014-2020)	 Northern	 Ireland	 is	
designated	 as	 a	 region	 in	 transition,	 whereas	
Ireland	 is	 in	 the	 more	 developed	 category.	 Thus	
the	 border	 separates	 different	 funding	 regimes.	
Under	 this	 categorisation	 Northern	 Ireland	 is	
currently	able	to	access	more	funding	than	Ireland.	
	
There	 are	 also	 specific	 programmes	which	 follow	
from	 the	 peace	 process	 which	 are	 aimed	 at	
increasing	 cross-border	 co-operation.	 The	 Special	 EU	 Programmes	 Body	 (PEACE	 IV	
Programme	 (2014-2020))	 provides	 funding	 to	 manage	 cross-border	 European	 Union	






INTERREG	 IVA	 provides	 structural	 funding	 for	 border	 regions.	 Ireland	 and	 Northern	
Ireland	 fall	 within	 several	 of	 the	 designated	 regions,	 North	 West	 Europe,	 Northern	
Periphery	 and	 Artic	 and	 the	 Atlantic	 Area.	 Under	 the	 Programme,	 Ireland/Northern	
Ireland/Scotland	is	recognised	as	a	region	requiring	specific	funding.	This	programme	is	
worth	 €240	 million,	 with	 €42	 million	 of	 matching	 funding	 from	 Ireland	 and	 the	 UK.	





money;	money	 that	will	 not	 go	
to	 Brussels	 but	 will	 come	 to	








Both	 of	 these	 schemes	 are	 aimed	 at	 providing	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 benefits	
across	the	border	regions	of	the	island.	While	it	is	possible	that	additional	funding	may	
be	available	as	 the	UK	will	no	 longer	be	 required	 to	contribute	 to	 the	EU	budget,	 this	
money	 has	 not	 been	 earmarked	 and	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 equivalent	 schemes	











When	Taoiseach	Enda	Kenny	 spoke	of	 the	 ‘serious	difficulties’	Brexit	would	 create	 for	
the	 Northern	 Ireland	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 peace	
process	 (and	engaged	 in	 repeated	 trips	 to	 the	UK	
in	 the	 weeks	 prior	 to	 the	 Referendum	 vote)	 his	
input	 was	 met	 with	 scepticism	 by	 some	 UK	
politicians.	 The	 House	 of	 Commons’	 Northern	
Ireland	 Affairs	 Committee	 was,	 for	 example,	
content	that	the	relations	between	London,	Dublin	
and	 Belfast	 would	 ‘continue	 to	 be	 very	 strong’	
even	 if	 the	 UK	 left	 the	 EU,	 moreover,	 they	 suggested	 that	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 less	
important	 for	 conflict	 resolution	 than	 the	 US.	 Nonetheless,	 potentially	 there	 are	






Eire	 cannot	 unite,	 they	 can	be	 good	neighbours’.	 But	 in	 spite	 of	 the	UK	 and	 Ireland’s	
Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 in	 1965,	 and	 the	meetings	 that	 year	 between	 Taoiseach	 Seán	
Lemass	and	Northern	Ireland’s	Terence	O’Neill,	official	interactions	remained	limited.		
	
As	 the	UK	remained	 Ireland’s	biggest	market,	 it	was	all	but	obliged	 to	 follow	the	UK’s	
efforts	 to	 join	 the	 then-EEC	 in	 the	 1960s.	With	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 Troubles,	 UK-Ireland	
relations	 became	 entangled	 within	 the	 increasingly	 bloody	 conflict.	 When	 in	 1971	
Ireland	 challenged	 the	 UK’s	 use	 of	 “enhanced	 interrogation”	 practices	 to	 get	
information	 out	 of	 internees	 as	 amounting	 to	 torture	 before	 the	 European	 Court	 of	
Campaigning	Claim	
“There’s	 absolutely	 no	
connection	 between	 the	 peace	









Human	 Rights,	 archival	 releases	 show	 that	 UK	 officials	 regarded	 this	 response	 as	
tantamount	to	‘a	diplomatic	declaration	of	war’.	
	
EEC	 membership,	 however,	 brought	 a	 new	 dimension	 to	 this	 fraught	 relationship.	
Ireland	 and	 the	 UK,	 as	 English-speaking	 islands	 on	 Europe’s	 North-West	 periphery,	
shared	many	interests	in	terms	of	European	policy.	European	Summits	obliged	ministers	
from	both	countries	to	participate	in	the	communal	“family	photographs”	and	enabled	
them	to	 forge	working	 relationships	 in	a	 context	 less	burdened	with	expectation	 than	





By	 the	 mid-1980s,	 when	 the	 Haughey-Thatcher	 relationship	 had	 soured	 and	 the	
aftermath	of	 the	Hunger	Strikes	made	 the	conflict	appear	as	 intractable	as	ever,	 John	
Hume	was	instrumental	in	securing	the	European	Parliament’s	Haagerup	Report	into	the	
conflict	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	The	Report	approached	 the	conflict	as	a	clash	of	national	
identities	 and	 conceived	 of	 Europe’s	 role	 as	 supporting	 the	 UK	 and	 Ireland	 in	 their	





the	party’,	providing	 funding	 through	 its	PEACE	 initiative	 (now	 in	 its	 fourth	cycle)	only	













Agreement,	 building	 on	 previous	 references	 in	 the	 Anglo-Irish	 Agreement.	 The	
implementation	of	EU	law	provides	one	of	the	Agreement’s	one	of	the	major	conduits	




The	 peace	 process	 will	 not	 implode	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Brexit,	 nor	 will	 Ireland’s	 close	
relations	 with	 the	 UK	 degrade	 overnight.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 EU’s	 role	 in	 building	 this	
relationship	should	not	be	 forgotten.	Whereas	 the	European	Project	drew	 Ireland	and	















For	 some	 years	 now,	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 peace	 process	 have	
enjoyed	 multilateral	 support	 from	 the	 main	Westminster	 political	 parties.	 The	 peace	
process	 has	 benefited	 from	 this	 position	 largely	 (though	 not	 entirely)	 outside	 of	 the	
usual	 ‘cut	 and	 thrust’	 party	 politics.	 Although	 it	 is	 not	 the	 express	 intention	 of	 the	
current	Conservative	Government	to	change	this	understanding,	the	EU	referendum	has	
sharply	divided	opinion	in	terms	of	its	implications	for	NI.	This	might	put	the	multilateral	






four	 constituent	 nations	 would	 carry	 symbolic	




the	 remainder	 of	 the	 UK	 such	 a	 vote	 could	 exacerbate	 tensions	 surrounding	 its	
constitutional	position.	
	
Even	 if	 the	 EU	 referendum	does	 not	 lead	 to	 Brexit,	 the	UK	Government’s	 negotiating	
platform	 could	 undermine	 relations	 between	 the	 Westminster	 and	 the	 devolved	
legislatures.	 As	 they	 stand,	 the	 proposals	 for	 national	 parliaments	 to	 “red	 card”	 EU	
policy	proposals	 (like	 the	existing	“yellow	card”	and	“orange	card”	mechanisms)	could	
be	 operated	 by	 the	UK	Government	without	 any	 need	 to	 seek	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	
devolved	 institutions.	Given	 the	 importance	of	agriculture	within	 the	Northern	 Ireland	
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Within	 the	 Good	 Friday/Belfast	 Agreement,	 the	 UK	 and	 Ireland’s	 relationship	 ‘as	
partners	 in	 the	 European	 Union’	 and	 as	 equal	 Council	 of	 Europe	 members	 (with	 its	
associated	 requirement	 of	 adherence	 to	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights)	
provided	much	of	 the	deal’s	 supranational	 architecture.	 There	are	 two	brief	points	 to	
note	here.	First,	there	is	significant	intricacy	in	the	way	in	which	(at	least)	three	sets	of	
international	law	obligations	are	intertwined.	The	EU,	the	European	Convention	and	the	
Good	 Friday/Belfast	 Agreement	 are	 essentially	 interdependent	 in	 their	 application	 to	
Northern	 Ireland.	Second	 is	 the	perceived	 importance	of	 the	EU	as	a	peace-sustaining	






rights	 protections	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 There	 exists	 an	 overlap	 between	 the	
Government’s	 human	 rights	 plans	 and	 EU	 questions.	 EU	membership	 is	 connected	 to	
human	 rights	 protections	 which	 themselves	 are	
essential	 for	 compliance	 with	 the	 Good	
Friday/Belfast	 Agreement.	 As	 such,	 to	 practically	
‘escape’	 ECHR	 standards,	 the	 UK	 would	 have	 to	
part	 company	 with	 both	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 ECHR.	
There	 is	 therefore	 a	 crucial	 interaction	 between	
EU	 membership	 debates	 and	 any	 forthcoming	
changes	to	the	UK’s	human	rights	architecture.	
	
Brexit	 will	 not	 remove	 the	 influence	 of	 pan-
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the	 articles	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 have	 followed	 extensive	
negotiations	 and	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 human	 rights	 within	 EU	 law.	 Although	 a	
recent	and	controversial	opinion	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	European	Union	 raised	
doubts	 over	 whether	 it	 was	 legally	 possible	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 become	 a	 party	 to	 the	
European	 Convention,	 these	 international	 legal	 orders	 are	 likely	 to	 continue	 to	




degree	 to	 which	 shortfalls	 in	 enforceable	 human	 rights	 standards	 within	 Northern	
Ireland	 law	 exacerbated	 and	 sustained	 the	 Troubles	 is	 marked	 by	 the	 importance	 of	




The	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 impact	 of	 Brexit	 on	 the	 1998	 settlement	 should	 be	
managed	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	 possible	 and	 not	 left	 to	 ad	 hoc	 solutions	 (or	 indeed,	
political	crises).	This	could	be	achieved	through	the	UK	Government	seeking	a	Bilateral	
Interpretive	Agreement	with	 the	 Irish	Government	 in	advance	of	 the	EU	Referendum.	
Ireland	 sought	 a	 similar	 agreement	 before	 its	 2004	 citizenship	 referendum.	 Such	 an	
Agreement	 would	 allow	 both	 countries	 to	 establish,	 in	 advance	 of	 Brexit,	 how	 UK	
withdrawal	 from	 the	 EU	 would	 impact	 upon	 the	 1998	 arrangements	 and	 Northern	
Ireland’s	constitutional	arrangements	more	generally.	Such	an	Agreement	would	be	 in	
keeping	 with	 Ireland’s	 position	 as	 co-guarantor	 of	 the	 peace	 process.	 Should	 Brexit	
occur	in	the	absence	of	such	an	agreement,	the	UK	and	Irish	Governments	should	seek	
to	 agree	 a	 common	 position	 on	 the	 affected	 provisions	 of	 the	 Good	 Friday/Belfast	
Agreement	 	 as	 soon	 as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 do	 so	 to	mitigate	 the	 consequent	 uncertainty	
surrounding	Northern	Ireland’s	governance.	
